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Helios High Altitude 
Long Endurance Mission 
 Mishap 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20090019663 2019-08-30T07:00:07+00:00Z
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Solar Aircraft History 
1996, 206 ft Wing Span, T.O. Weight 1385-1801 lbs, 3 flights, 3.4 hrs 
1999, 247 ft Wing Span, T.O. Weight 1557-1853 lbs, 8 flights, 43.8 hrs 
2003, added center pod fuel cell & wing tip GH2 tanks, T.O. Weight 2320 lbs, 3 flights, 15.4 hrs 
Flew to record 96,863 ft in Aug 2001 
~ 500 lbs heavier that ever flown 
1981,  98 ft Wing Span, T.O. Weight 560 lbs, 39 flights 
1998, 121 ft Wing Span, T.O. Weight 716 lbs, 7 flights 
Flew to record 71,500 ft in 1997 
Flew to record 86,201 ft in 1998 
205 flight hrs, 39 hrs above 50K 
Evolution of the  
Long-Endurance Configuration 
Helios Prototype (HP01)  
with Planned 
Regenerative Fuel Cell System 
Helios Prototype (HP03) 
with Hydrogen - Air  
Fuel Cell System 
(Three Point Masses) 
Helios Prototype (HP01) 
Spanloader Configuration 
Total Weight - 1585 lbs 
247 feet 
212 lbs 212 lbs 
Estimated 
Total Weight - 1810 lbs 
520 lbs 165 lbs 165 lbs 
Total Weight - 2320 lbs 
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Helios 2003 Configuration 
247’ Wing Span 
10 Electric Motordrives 
GH2/Air Fuel Cell 
(520 lbs) 
- Two 4400 psi Composite 
  GH2 Fuel Tanks 
- Capacity: 15 lbs GH2 each 
- Weight: 165 lbs each 
64,000 Bi-Facial 
Solar Cells 
5 Landing Gear Pods 
6 Wing Panel Sections 
Standard FTS Parachute 
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Hydrogen 
Fill Station
Helios 
Hangar
Helios 
Runway
Ground Control 
Station and 
Trackers
2003 Flight Operations 
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Flight Test Safety 
 Project Plan, SSP, SSWG, PHL, PHA, SSHA, 
SHA, O&SHA, MP, RSOP, & RID 
 Flight Approval 
• Used previous hazard analyses as starting point for aircraft ops 
• New challenges: 
• Fuel cell & GH2 tanks handling & storage 
• Multi-day mission (crew fatigue, crew rotation, crew qualifications, night 
landings, etc.) 
• Performed FMECA on the Fuel Cell System 
• Performed Facilities Hazard Analysis on the GH2 Fill Station 
• Performed Fault Tree Analysis on the FTS 
• TRRs, FRR, AFSRB, Tech Briefs 
• Hazard Matrices & Accepted Risk List 
Helicopter Shear Line Observations 
Northern Wind  
Shear Line 
Southern Wind 
Shear Line 
Helicopter  
Observed Wind  
Shear Lines 
HP03-2 Flight Path 
with Wind Speed  
and Direction 
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Helios 2003 Flight Activity 
Project goal: Using the Solar/Fuel Cell configuration, fly greater than 14 hours at 50,000 feet. 
 First Flight (5/15/03,straight line takeoff & landing; aka, high speed taxi) 
• Mission dress rehearsal 
• Verified aircraft dihedral compared to model predictions 
• Successful flight 
 Second Flight (6/7/03, took off at 8:45am, landed at 11:45pm) 
• Demonstrated the readiness of the aircraft systems, fuel cell system, GCSs, flight support 
equipment, range support instrumentation, and procedures required for a multi-day flight 
• A leak in the compressor system precluded full fuel cell operation at 50,000 feet 
• Successful flight 
 Third (mishap) Flight (6/26/03, took off at 8:45am) 
• Conduct a single-day checkout flight and operate the fuel cell system for 1 hour at 50K  
• Achieve rated flight power 
• Develop confidence that the fuel cell can run all night 
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Pilot Controller 
HP03-2 on Take-Off 
HP03-2 with Normal Wing Dihedral HP03-2 with Persistent High Wing Dihedral 
Photos Taken of HP03-2 
26 June 2003 
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Mishap Day Takeoff 
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Mishap Flight Events 
 The aircraft experienced control problems 
approximately 30 minutes after takeoff while climbing 
through 2,900 feet… 
• The aircraft impacted the water within the confines of the Pacific 
Missile Range Facility, approximately 10 miles west of the island of 
Kauai 
• Except for loss of the aircraft, no property damage, environmental 
hazard, or personnel injury resulted from the mishap 
• The aircraft entered a series of severe pitch oscillations, resulting 
in some failure of the secondary structure, and could no longer 
generate lift 
• Approximately 70% of the aircraft (by weight) was recovered, 
including the two hydrogen fuel tanks 
Photos Taken of HP03-2  
Following Mishap 
Falling to the Pacific Helios Upon Impact with the Ocean 
Navy Ship Providing Surveillance of Debris Close-Up of Floating Debris 16 
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The Helios Mishap Root Causes 
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The Helios Mishap Recommendations 
Contributing Factors and  
Recommendations (Continued) 
•   The Review Process Was Not Structured to Adequately Identify the  
    Risks Associated with this Vehicle Design, Especially as Design  
    Margins Were Decreasing and Complexity Was Increasing 
Recommendation: 
   Enhance the Depth and Independence of Technical Participation in 
the Research  Areas of this Class of Vehicle 
Take-Off and Landing of this Class of Vehicle Are High 
Pilot/Crew Workload  Events with Significant Elevated Risk 
Contributing Factors and  
Recommendations (Continued) 
•   Pilot Control Module/Interface Lacked Features that Would Afford the  
    Pilot the Ability to Recognize and Mitigate an Impending Departure  
    from Controlled Flight in a Timely Manner 
Recommendations: 
   Develop a Human/Vehicle System Interface to Better Conduct Research for this  
      Class of Vehicle 
   Improve the Pilot/Crew Displays to Allow Better Recognition and Situational  
      Awareness of Slow Developing Hazardous Events 
   Consider Adding Attitude Indicator to Improve Pilot’s Situational Awareness 
   Develop a Method to Measure Wing Dihedral in Real-Time with a Visual Display  
      Available to the Test Crew 
   Develop Manual and/or Automatic Techniques to Control Wing Dihedral in Flight 
   Re-evaluate Providing Capability that Allows Pilot to Better Mitigate Unusual Flight  
      Occurrences 
Contributing Factors and  
Recommendations (Continued) 
•   Pre-Conditioning Associated with Previous Successful yet Infrequent  
    Flights of this Class of Vehicle, Encounters with Benign Unstable  
    Phugoid Responses, and Informal Crew Training Inhibited the Team’s  
    Ability to Predict, Identify, and React to the Impending Instability 
Recommendations: 
   Further Refine the Roles and Responsibilities of the Crewmembers to Improve  
     Overall Team Response to Unexpected and Anticipated Emergency Conditions 
   Refine Emergency Recognition Criteria to Improve Team Emergency Response 
   Perform Simulations to Develop Recognition Criteria that Identify the Vehicle’s  
      Response Toward and During Instabilities 
   Improve the Fidelity of Aircrew Simulations to Mitigate the Risks Associated with  
     Landing and Take-Off  
Significant Observations 
and Recommendations 
 Pilot and Crewmembers Failed to Recognize Instability in a 
Timely Manner 
Recommendations: 
   Develop Capability to Perform Simulations of the Vehicle’s 
Response to  Disturbances 
   Improve Training Program and Use Simulations to Enhance Crew 
Resource  Management During Normal, Emergency, and Unstable 
Flight Conditions 
   Apply Crew Resource Management Techniques to Enhance Crew 
Ability for Identifying and Responding to Emergency and Unstable 
Flight Conditions 
Significant Observations  
and Recommendations 
•   Pilot Was Task-Saturated, Particularly During Mishap Event  
Recommendations: 
   Improve Interfaces to Alleviate Pilot Task-Saturation  
   Re-Evaluate Pilot and Test Team Responsibilities to Optimize Task 
Management 
   Extend Test Team Responsibilities to Include more Participatory 
Tasks with  Provisions for Providing Advisory Status of Systems 
Operation  
Significant Observations  
and Recommendations 
Aerospace Expert Onboard Photo Helicopter Not Linked to a 
Command  and Control Frequency 
Recommendations: 
   If Photo Helicopters Are Available, Consider Providing Capability 
for Direct  Voice  Communication Between the Helicopter and the 
Helios Pilot as Long as this Communication Does Not Appreciably 
Add to Helios Pilot Workload  
   Consider the Chase Plane Concept of Operations to Improve 
Overall Test Team Management of Unexpected and Anticipated 
Emergency or Unstable Conditions 
Lessons Learned 
Crew Training 
•   Flight Crew Training Syllabus Development Could Benefit 
by Cross Talk and Visits to UAV Developers and Operators 
•   Lack of Crew Resource Management Techniques and    
Methodologies Can Significantly Handicap a Test Team’s 
Ability to Successfully Negotiate Unanticipated Emergency or 
Unstable Conditions  
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Lessons Learned: Assessing the Level of Risk 
 Track programmatic decisions affecting design and assess the 
impact on mission success at each phase of the program 
 Monitor the cumulative effect of: 
• Slow increases in gross weight 
• Narrowing margins 
• Pressures to fly (schedule, budget, & manpower) 
• Range airspace availability 
• Range assets availability 
• Frequency management issues or conflictions 
 While concentrating on “Single Point Failures” and “Single 
String Systems”, don’t overlook credible “Multiple Failure 
Scenarios” 
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Q & A? 
NASA has released a publicly available detailed report on the 
Helios Mishap which can be found at:  
http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/64317main_helios.pdf 
